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A Southern Historian's Appeal

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HORACE GREELEY,

BY

EDWARD A. POLLARD.

I. Reasons why the South should Support Horace Greeley
for President of the United States.

II. A Reply to Mr. Voorhees' Speech, and other Attacks on
Mr. Greeley.

1. MR. GREELEY BEFORE THE WAR.
2. MR. GREELEY IN THE WAR.
3. MR. GREELEY SINCE THE WAR.
4. MR. GREELEY ON THE CINCINNATI PLATFORM.

LYNCHBURG, VA.

DAILY REPUBLICAN BOOK AND JOB PRINTING ESTABLISHMENT.

1872.

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EXPLANATORY.

The following letters are composed from some letters, written hastily and with the haggard pen of an invalid, and originally published in the Lynchburg (Va.) REPUBLICAN: a paper which we find correctly designated by the New York *Herald*, in a recent classification of the Southern press, as "the most influential journal of the Democratic party in Southwest Virginia." If these letters or articles may now reach other parts of the South, or any quarters where there may yet linger any debate as to Mr. Greeley's claims on the Southern Democratic or Conservative vote, the object of their present republication will have been attained.

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A Southern Historian's Appeal for Horace Greeley.

To the Editors of the Lynchburg Republican :

THE SOUTH, A PARTY FOR HERSELF.

There are peculiar, very peculiar, reasons why the South should support Mr. Greeley for President of the United States; and I refer to them now, that it may be known that whatever the Democratic Convention, awaiting call, does, the South has reasons of her own to adhere to Mr. Greeley, and to endorse him with all possible unanimity. It is hardly possible that the Convention will repudiate Mr. Greeley; yet, for the present, not considering its action, I would notice here particularly Mr. Greeley's claims upon the South, and the expectations she may found upon him as a candidate. Believe me it is the grand opportunity of the South; and it arouses me even out of the tedium and incapacity of an invalid, (a moribund for nearly two years), to resume a pen which, for offices at least of the newspaper, I had thought to have consigned to rust, and to charge it with words of counsel and entreaty to my countrymen.

I am at pains to explain, in the outset, the standpoint from which I write:—the interests of the South *as the South*. It is a higher inspiration than a partisan one in which I would express myself, and ask the participation of my Southern countrymen. A Democrat myself, I yet deprecate the too complete identification of the South with the Democratic party; and I believe that, on some occasions, the South has interests distinct enough and large enough to constitute a party for herself—a new autonomy in the politics of the country.

The allegiance of the South to the Democratic party is at best but slight, and holds but by a mended and frayed strand. It was disrupted by the late war. Since that interval, which was not only a complete fissure, but an exasperated breach, the party tie of the South has been knitted up again, only in the most loose and accidental manner. The South does not forget that she was prompted into the last disastrous war by the Democratic party, and then deserted by it. Since the war, her resumption of an alliance with this party could not be other-

wise than feeble and distrustful; a mere matter of convenience to serve present necessities, with the implied understanding that whenever those necessities or the peculiar interests of the South could be better served by a departure from the Democratic party, she would not hesitate to make it, and generally hereafter to hold her own interests superior to the technical obligations of any political party, and especially those which had once been broken, to her own injury and betrayal.

THE SUPREME AND PECULIAR WANTS OF THE SOUTH.

But whatever the sequel at Baltimore, the South has a much better reason than her Democratic partisanship, to determine her to Mr. Greeley's support. Her old party ties are, at best, impaired and incoherent, and will scarcely hold against any grave and distinct interests which she may have as a section peculiarly placed in the Union. In such interests we may find united in the South Democratic Republicans and Republican Democrats, conservative white men and conservative black men, in brief, *Southerners* without distinction of old parties; and such precisely are the interests represented in the nomination of Mr. Greeley. The great, peculiar want of the South, and that infinitely above all considerations of technical party politics, is PEACE: a want which has two aspects: first, that of the relations of the South to the General Government, and, second, that of the relations of her own internal police and order. Now, this double pacification of the South is what is to be accomplished by the election of Mr. Greeley, and that, too, in each branch of the mission, by means at once peculiar and precise.

PROBLEM OF PACIFICATION OF THE SOUTH.

1. It will compose the Federal relations of the South, and assure peace in that aspect, through the means of universal amnesty and generally a policy whose fundamental principles and vital inspiration shall be absolute forgiveness of the past.

2. It will furnish for the first time a point of union between the mass of the native whites of the South and the negro voter; a union which is the supreme *desideratum* of the South, the most distinct and necessary condition of her internal peace and future development, that which her statesmanship and her ingenuity have heretofore been taxed in vain to accomplish, now almost providentially offered her.

FORWARD, THE NEGRO.

The bringing together the negro and the "Conservative" whites of the South on the question of Mr. Greeley's election, is its happiest and most peculiar circumstance. It cannot be doubted that Mr. Greeley will carry off a large portion of the negro vote of the South by virtue of his most decided and most romantic record as an abolitionist, that by which the negro remembers him as his very Moses in the house of bondage and in the exodus. Certainly no stronger appeal could be made to the gratitude of the negro, a sentiment in which his simple and fervent

nature is said to excel. On the other hand, the name of Horace Greeley has its own addresses and associations for the white voters of the South. He represents to them universal amnesty—the importance of which is not the number of persons it would actually relieve, (for in this respect, indeed, it is a very small measure), but its *moral effect*, as a pledge to the South, given under the emphasis of a public law, that whatever there had been of offense in the past should be accounted or remembered against her no more forever.

“GO BACK, THIEVES.”

He represents much of generous counsel to the South; he has recommended her-lands to immigration; he is the natural and sworn enemy of the carpet-bagger; and he is the author of the sentiment far more meaning to the South than all the political apothegms of the day—“*go back, thieves!*” He represents whatever may be emollient of the past policy of “reconstruction” in a future policy that shall be the declared end of punishment, recrimination and distrust; and where Grant has offered the bayonet, he is willing to challenge the friendship and confidence of the South, and to make them the basis of a solid and assured pacification.

THE SOUTH NOT TO ASK TOO MUCH.

Any benefits more than these, the South cannot expect, in any circumstances, at present; and any excess in her demands would be only likely to risk her utter denial, including that which she might have gained by moderate petitions. Mr. Greeley, as President, would be able to serve her measurably; his influence in the Republican party would make his policy towards the South available; whereas, even if the South could elect a pronounced Democrat as President, it would be merely the signal to revive against her the suspicion and resentment of a hostile majority in Congress, and to repeat the story of Andrew Johnson, whose administration, it cannot now be doubted, proved, however contrary to its intentions, a positive prejudice to the South, an exasperation of the penalties of “Reconstruction.”

SOME PLAIN GREAT FACTS.

There are some plain great facts in Mr. Greeley’s case which it is impossible for the South to ignore, and which it will be criminal in her to neglect. It is, we repeat, *her great opportunity*. Here is the fact: that Mr. Greeley can, within limits, and those limits which are practically possible, serve her more effectually than any other man in America, even if that man were, the most pronounced partisan that a Democratic convention could name. Here is the fact: that Mr. Greeley offers the peculiar opportunity—an opportunity growing entirely out of his personality—to effect a union between the native whites of the South and the negroes, which may naturally ripen into that conciliation and confirmed alliance of the two which is the first, deepest and most

indispensable want of the South. Here is the fact: that Mr. Greeley will make *the peace of the South* a main object of his administration, and by a policy and means which, however its details may be reserved, we have at last the significant satisfaction of knowing will be the opposite of that which he has stigmatized as a "failure."

PEACE! PEACE!

And this aspiration for PEACE is so supreme and keen throughout the land, represents so many interests, unites so many parties, that it, alone, unaided by other cries, or superior to them, may prove sufficient to elect Horace Greeley President of the United States.

THE FAILURE OF GRANT'S ADMINISTRATION.

The confusions of a great political controversy that is at last to be decided by the people, are never as hopeless as they seem. Notwithstanding all the refinements and complications which the ingenuity of argument may impose in such controversy, despite all it may do to darken counsel, it will be found that some plain dominant facts will invariably rise above these refinements, emerge from the ambitious confusion of debate, and govern the popular decision. The popular mind, indeed, is but little affected by either the ingenuity or accumulation of arguments in any cause given to its judgment; these may serve their purposes in answering the intellectual wants of a few, or in occupying the professional arenas of debate; but generally a few blunt facts which the skill of the dialectician can in no wise control, which are simply incontestable, suffice to determine the verdict of the people. This simplification of a vexed controversy at the last, the limitation of it which the popular mind makes to a few governing facts, its summary practice of decision in this respect, have been frequently illustrated in the history of our political contests; and, if we are not greatly mistaken, we are about to obtain a new and striking example of it in the attempted elaboration of the impending Presidential campaign, where one single plain fact already overrides the confused prospect, and promises to be decisive of a contest that otherwise it will be quite needless to burden with argument.

Such is the fact which no hardihood can gainsay, no argument can overcome, no ingenuity hide or diminish, and which already emerges out of the mists of controversy—the promontory of the political situation—that Grant's administration is a failure, precisely in that respect in which it had given the most ostentatious and emphatic pledge of success. We refer to the attempted *role* of "the Great Pacifier." The historical mission which awaited President Grant was plainly to complete the pacification of the country after a painful war, and in pursuance of a policy of which he had unlimited control. The task was accepted not only with alacrity, but pretentionally; the reduction of the country to a perfect and enduring peace was to be the great historical feature of General Grant's Presidential term; on this he staked his ambition, and

invited the observation and judgment of the people. He came into office with the emphasis of the words: "Let us have peace;" this was to be the key note of his administration, its peculiar inspiration; it was here that he was to command the confidence of the people, and to deserve their greatest rewards. What has become of this special and emphatic pledge, made above all others, and that above all others was to be decisive of his success or failure, with which General Grant entered office, and undertook the task of government?—A voice answers from an unexpected quarter.

THE KU-KLUX REPORT, "RETURNED TO PLAGUE ITS INVENTORS."

It was some time ago reported that busy hands had distributed from Washington through the country, not less than sixty thousand copies of the majority report of the Ku-Klux Committee. We rejoice to hear it, we would gladly aid the circulation; for never has any paper gone forth from Washington that contains a more damaging exposition, a confession, now, thank God, impossible to be recalled, of the downright and fatal failure of President Grant's administration. The Ku-Klux report, although made with the special design to defame the South, and to find excuses for stretches of arbitrary power, has already recoiled upon its inventors, and returns to plague them, as the most disastrous evidence yet given to the country to condemn the policy of the Radical party, and to convict their leader of a broken promise, and of a boast brought to open and irretrievable shame. There is nothing so damaging as confessions which escape under the influence of a passion which is for the moment superior to the culprit's motive and care to hide his peculiar guilt, and has thus thrown him entirely off his guard. Blinded by hate and by the intentness of an evil design, the chroniclers of the Ku-Klux, and those who have sown the country with their reports, appear never to have reflected that after the first impression they might secure of a feeling hostile to the South, the next, and inevitable thought that would occur to the readers would be: if the things described in these pages be true, or if only a tithe of them be so, how is it that a Republican administration has so failed of its promises and pledges?—how comes it that the South has been so hostilized?—what can be the prime cause of a condition so deplorable, and so utterly at variance with what we were led to expect when President Grant came into power with the adjuration of a peace to be presently realized? Such reflections are bound to be mingled with even the severest criminations that may involve the South, according to the special, yet short-sighted design of her accusers. Whatever the allotment of censure on this head, the popular mind finds itself making this further and indispensable reflection: must not the policy be essentially defective that with the best conditions for the pacification of the country, conditions which it recognized on assuming office, conditions so secure that it founded on them the most boastful promises and assurances, should yet seven years after a war had been closed with the ceremonies of complete surrender, and after all the time which said policy

has had for its full and free experiment, be asking for a military machinery to suppress a "rebellion," and confessing, though unwittingly, and in a sinister interest, yet all the more forcibly on that account, that the bayonet has become its indispensable aid and servitor in governing the country?

Here is the one fact of failure that seems to be decisive—and that, too, as President Grant deliberately chose to make the issue for himself—of the claim of the present Administration for a continuation of the confidence of the American public. It is a fact so patent that no ingenuity can conceal it; so dominant that inferior discussions cannot subordinate it to themselves; so pregnant of the hope and interest of the country that it is no exaggeration to suppose that it alone may yet direct the decision of the people in a political campaign that is to culminate in a choice of President. If there is one thing which the country wants more than all else, for which it has incomparable desire, and in hoping for which it has nearly worn out its heart, it is *peace*. President Grant has not given it; he has forfeited the most distinct and ostentatious pledge he made, when inaugurated three years ago; and his demented followers, struck by the blindness that foreruns their destruction, have just published to the world the certainty of the forfeiture he has incurred, and an assurance of the moral and intellectual incompetency which it implies! In short, the great historical outcome of the Grant Administration is that it has failed in what it was particularly appointed and expected to do; a failure aggravated in shame by its own confessions seduced from it in another cause, and ignominious in proportion to the height and insolence of the promises with which it had once captivated the public confidence.

A RETROSPECT.

In the close of the year 1865, the same man who is now President, wrote with the exactness of a military report, and under the obligations of an official inquiry, that he was "satisfied that the mass of thinking men of the South accept the present situation of affairs in good faith," and that his observations led him "to the conclusion that the citizens of the Southern States are anxious to return to self-government within the Union as soon as possible." In 1869, the author of this assurance ascended the Executive chair of the nation. What had intervened in the meantime? The distinctly chosen policy of Radical reconstruction that had overridden Andrew Johnson's simpler and readier policy of restoration, which he had inherited from Lincoln. In the midst of that policy came the invocation and the apothegm, "let us have peace." Naught has happened to cross that policy, except of its own making; there has been no marring interruption; no defeat of it possible, unless from its own inherent defects. It had a clear field in the South; it has sustained the interruption of no other party in power; it has met with no extraordinary accidents; there has been nothing to make its results exceptional, or other than what are logically due to its own unthwarted

and unrestrained methods of action. Now, after the fullest and most sperate experiment, the confession escapes that that policy has been a failure, and a failure of the worst sort! Yet what shall we say of the effrontery that, with this confession warm in its mouth, asks for a continuation of power and of public confidence; asking it from a people to whose hopes it has given the severest disappointment; asking it from the Republican party which it has robbed of the peculiar prestige on which it most prided itself, that of "peace-maker"—in every sense, even in the low one of a partisan appeal, asking it with a plain, self-confessed unworthiness and an insolence as stark as its shamelessness is supreme!

THE TRUE MEASURE OF THE HOPE OF THE SOUTH.

What might have been the results of a policy of kindness and trust towards the South, is a question we are not permitted to answer out of the verifications of experience, for the reason that such an experiment has never, to any appreciable extent, been tried. But there can be no doubt of the failure of the suspicious and punitory policy of "Reconstruction;" that cannot be undone; and yet there remains some room for mollification, and for that mollification we know nothing that can be better trusted than Mr. Greeley's policy of amnesty, and a thorough appeal to the generosity of the South to "let bygones be bygones," and to improve the future as from a new date of action. This is the measure of the true hope of the South. The penalties of Reconstruction cannot be expunged; the Constitutional Amendments are fixed and irreversible; yet something may be taken from the sting of present animosities and suspicions, the soldier may be disarmed, the carpet-bagger be dismissed, the industry of the South be re-assured, and her confidence be reclaimed, at least on the basis that there shall be no continuation of the penalties of war, or even of the distrust and recrimination they imply. This only sperate and practicable margin of relief left for the South is represented by Horace Greeley; and if the experiment can essentially be only a partial one, yet better this, better something of departure and novelty than continuation and possible increase of a policy in which the South is more and more hostilized, and Grant stands to-day in the position of one accused by *Junius*:—"I will not, my lord, call you a liar; but I will prove you one!"

MR. GREELEY IN HIS BEST POSITION.

Horace Greeley comes before the country through the broken promise of Gen. Grant, and in that breach stands to best advantage; the man peculiarly calculated to be the *Pacificator* of the country. We do not reckon here his other recommendations to office; we prefer to present him in this single strong light, and that which implies his dominant claim on the vote and confidence of the South.

In this light, and with his peculiar faculty to unite the white and negro vote, he may carry *every* Southern State; and in this case it would

be madness for the South to subordinate her influences so large, so distinct, weighing so much in the Presidential campaign, and yet so peculiarly *Southern*, to the dictation of any merely political party.

PERSONAL ESTIMATE OF GREELEY—"THE PHILOSOPHER."

Of Mr. Greeley as a man we can scarcely escape saying something, in view of the strong personal peculiarities which have made his name a household word in America. The writer does not hesitate to say that though differing in some points of politics from Mr. Greeley *toto cælo*, he has always found much to admire in him, and years before his nomination had deemed it a privilege to sometimes speak to him in tones of personal friendship. The man called by popular instinct "*The Philosopher of the Tribune*," has always appeared to us a striking representative of the zeal of the enthusiast and the generosity of the disputant. He is an illustration of the power of CANDOR, in its best sense; teaching the sublime lesson that generosity to opponents, so far from implying a weakness or equivocation in our allegiance to TRUTH, is not only consistent with the highest enthusiasm in that cause, but actually promotes such enthusiasm, and realizes a positive power peculiarly its own in the support of its cause. The man who allows to opposition whatever there is of truth in it, is he who has the clearest and fullest conception of whatever is in question; for it is because of the justice and fullness of his conception that he can afford such recognitions to his opponent, and these concessions, made as they are out of the very spirit of Truth not only consistent with that spirit, but cultivating and enlarging it, have an effect to conquer opposition, such as the mere bigot or stickler can never have.

How well are these lessons illustrated in Mr. Greeley's life! In the cause of anti-slavery, for instance, his zeal was certainly not less than that of Wendell Phillips and the other fierce bigots who never had a word of qualification for their opinions. Because he might see some cause of condonation, might be the man to forgive Jeff. Davis and to plead for amnesty for the South, was his zeal against "slavery" or "rebellion" less in point of sincerity than that of those who made an unmitigated outcry—and how infinitely greater was it, in respect of effectiveness! Mr. Greeley's characteristic habit of fair allowance to his opponents has been the secret of his success, and the foundation of a fame that is the most enviable in America. It is as representative of the "philosophic spirit" that he is best known and respected, and his word sought in judgment. There are many other writers on the American press more brilliant than he; many intellects which may match his; and yet in the ranks of American journalism not one of his real power, measured by effects. To-day this great editor has the distinction of wielding a moral power which the highest officer or place-holder in the land might covet; there is a sort of judicial appeal to this man from all controversies in the country—the most distant disputes are brought to him, and his opinion on any subject is at once quoted from one end of

America to the other. It is the instance of a peculiar power obtained by a long habit of "fairness" in its best sense, which certainly never has been with the editor of the *New York Tribune* a weak or compromising "candor," or at the expense of a real genuine enthusiasm in the cause of what he believes to be true. An example of the philosophic spirit, and that highest and most enviable of all reputations which it builds up, and that may well be offered for the ambition and aspiration of all who in the competitions of life contend for really useful service or honorable fame.

THE CROWN.

Such a reputation is now aptly crowned by a nomination to the highest office in America, proceeding more directly from the *People*, and with less of intermediation to obstruct or discolor its significance as such an offering than ever did a Presidential nomination before. This honor Mr. Greeley has accepted, (we refer now only to his brief despatch on first hearing the news from Cincinnati,) with a simplicity and directness appropriate to the peculiar manner of its offering, and becoming the sentiment which he had formerly written in his paper, that "a Presidential nomination was a thing neither to be sought nor declined." He has not affected the maid's part—"still answer nay, and take it"; nor has he, as one disappointed candidate we wot of at Cincinnati, essayed—

"Tongue-tied ambition, not replying, yielded,
To bear the golden yoke of sovereignty."

There has been a spontaniety on the part of the people in offering the greatest honor in their gift to "the sage of Chappaqua," and a simple honesty of grateful expression in his accepting it, that makes up one of the most pleasing and direct pictures that the country has ever had of the people rewarding the patriots who least expected it, at the expense of politicians and wire-pullers in the background; daring its decision in the midst of angry political parties, and at the defiance of ambitious rivals, to mark a merit infinitely above that of mere partisanship, and too modest to have ever claimed as a reward what with readiness and dignity it yet accepts as a trust; a true Republican coronation;—a picture worthy to be framed as of better days of the Republic, and to be appropriately inscribed with the shout said to have been raised on the scene—"Hurrah for the second Declaration of Independence."

EDWARD A. POLLARD.

Lynchburg, Va., May 8, 1872.

II.

A Reply to Mr. Voorhees' Speech and to Other Attacks on Mr. Greeley.

In the speech against Horace Greeley, which Mr. Voorhees interjected into the proceedings of Congress shortly after the Cincinnati nomination, there is one mistake from beginning to end. It was a speech introduced under a false pretence—that of “personal explanation” in reply to a newspaper paragraph;—and, as it was a mean and insidious violation of parliamentary privileges, so was all its inspiration evil, and no one can read the speech without observing how it is choked and hesitates with the expectoration of a private and personal malice.

But one mistake kills it in the South. It is the supposition that runs all through it—that an appeal may yet be made in the South to the questions and passions which ante-dated or inspired the war; and that on these Mr. Greeley may be irretrievably condemned in Southern estimation. This is Mr. Voorhees' fatal mistake, and that also of his followers among the few impracticable Bourbons who still hang on to the withered tits of Bellona, and would

“Pour the sweet milk of concord into hell;”

or the yet more contemptible “cow-boys,” who lived on the borders of the late war, doing the dirty work which all wars must needs have, and who never charged anything more formidable in the field of Mars than a transportation wagon or a paymaster's chest.

GENERAL LEE'S EXAMPLE AND COUNSEL.

Happily, the South has better advisers than these. In a few words it may be said that the philosophy which prevails in the South, and the counsel notably committed to it by the examples and words of such men as Robert E. Lee, is that we should allow to those who fought against us in the late war the same measure of sincerity and honesty in *their* zeal and devotion which we claim on our side for ourselves; and that on such allowance, no less logical than charitable, we should found the only real and genuine reconciliation of which the passions of the past war are capable. On this understanding, then, it is quite impossible, plainly illogical and unfair, to impeach any Northern man for zeal or devotion on *his* side in the war; and we repeat that it was this understanding that was suggested by General Lee as containing the key to pacification after the war, that has since been recommended by all the Christianity, worth and chivalry of the South, and that is so plainly fair, such an obvious version of the “Golden Rule,” and such a reflec-

tion of common sense, that it is no longer questioned, unless among the narrowest of politicians and the most unreasoning of demagogues.

A TRIBUTE TO GENERAL LEE.

We have particularly mentioned here the name of General Lee—*clarum et venerabile nomen* in the South—since we are assured that were he living to-day, he would be one of the heartiest supporters that Mr. Greeley will find, even in all the abundant enthusiasm of the South. He was the man who, of all others, best explained the true significance and virtue of those much-abused words: “accepting the situation.” To one habitually admitted into his counsels, he is said to have frequently spoken of the meaning he attached to his *surrender* at Appomattox Courthouse. “The surrender of the South,” he explained, “meant that she should not only abandon her arms, but abandon, also, all enmity and negative position, and accept with cheerful alacrity the changes of the time.” And he illustrated this doctrine in his own conduct, when, in conformity to it, and yet with much of that natural elasticity with which the true hero rises from misfortune, he took up the broken thread of his life, resolved to emerge from retirement, and cheerfully qualified himself for such active employment as the broken fortunes of the South had to bestow upon him.

In the light of such lessons it has become agreed in the South that the honest “Confederate,” the man who now gives the best proofs of wisdom and affection for the land he loves, is not he who disputes and disparages the restored Federal authority, or resents the results of the war by private violence, or shows an unjust temper to the unoffending negro. The standard of Southern patriotism is now quite to the contrary. He comes best up to it who gave his whole heart and soul to the cause when the war prevailed; but who, having surrendered, observes with a scrupulous and knightly fidelity all its terms and conditions, and all the obligations implied by the oaths he took; who keeps the peace, aims at the repose and welfare of his people, and, by example and influence, endeavors so to shape the Southern conduct, as to leave the North no excuse, either for a vindictive penalty or a railing accusation. And especially will he not give occasion to such accusation by impeaching the sincerity or zeal of those on the other side, and thus opening a chapter of recriminations as needless as they are endless.

“TU QUOQUE.”

We denounce the attempt of Mr. Voorhees, and that of all of his persuasion or following, to found now any prejudices in the Southern mind against Mr. Greeley, because he stood manfully and zealously up to *his* side in the war. We denounce it as illogical, unfair, seditious, tending only to useless exasperations, and as containing matter which may be justly cast into our own teeth. If Mr. Greeley was zealous for his side, so were we for ours. But while thus denying the whole inspiration of Mr. Voorhees’ speech, and protesting that he has opened the

door to a controversy that might well have been shut out, the writer dares to engage him even in that controversy, to meet him on his own factiously raised grounds, and to go with him step by step over the whole record of the public life of the Cincinnati nominee, and at the end of the record thus traversed, to challenge for said nominee the vote, the confidence, and even the enthusiasm of the South. The order of Mr. Voorhees speech is naturally chronological; at least that order is convenient enough for our steps in the controversy, and we may number our articles in reply, as Mr. Greeley *before* the war, Mr. Greeley *in* the war, and Mr. Greeley *since* the war.

[No. 1.]

MR. GREELEY BEFORE THE WAR.

Mr. Voorhees complains bitterly enough that Mr. Greeley, after favoring the rights of the Southern States to withdraw from the Union in peace, afterwards joined in the cry of "On to Richmond," and became a zealous advocate of the war. Very true; and perfectly defensible is Mr. Greeley here by the very examples of some of our best Southern men, *mutatis mutandis*. What is most remarkable we find this special impeachment of Mr. Greeley echoed by some hypercritical Southern patriots who are precisely in the analogous or equivalent situation: that they opposed secession even bitterly, and yet changed their position as Mr. Greeley changed his, when his government and his people resolved upon war—and have ever claimed it as an honorable distinction that they were thus converted! They were Union men, when, as they claim, (though by an exaggeration which we shall presently notice,) that Mr. Greeley was a secessionist, and they were secessionists when Mr. Greeley was a Union man; that is all—and now where does the laugh come in, or where does the sneer find its place to pinch? We know very well that it has generally been esteemed a distinction in the South (we shall not argue here with what reason,) that one unwillingly and against his individual preferences took up arms for secession, when his State and people had decided for it, and, having once taken them up, wielded them with a thorough devotion and an undivided zeal that never looked back upon the questions of the past. The fame of the great Robert E. Lee is precisely in this category, and the *quondam* Union man, who yet fought efficiently for the seceded States, has become a type of peculiar honor, and a dear tradition in the South. Surely, we might make the justice of a similar distinction for Mr. Greeley, that when his government and people became committed in the war, he went into it, even against all his former aspirations; and that when he did thus go, he went *with his whole heart*, is rather an honor than otherwise, not only as measured by the logic of the South turned upon itself, but in the estimation of all those who think enthusiasm the best quality of a service

once fairly enlisted, and that whatever work is to be done had better be done heartily and effectually.

"It was a maxim of Captain Swösser," says Mrs. Badger (of Dickens' "Bleak House"), "speaking in his figurative naval manner, that when you make pitch hot, you cannot make it too hot; and that if you have only to swab a plank, you should swab it as if Davy Jones was after you."

A HISTORICAL DISCOVERY—CONCESSION VS. SECESSION.

Now, if Mr. Greeley, after having been overruled at Washington, did make the war very hot and was for finishing it up effectually, he was simply a man after Captain Swösser's heart, and *we* are not the parties to bring against him a railing accusation. But Mr. Greeley's disposition is even much more defensible than the Union-piper in the South, afterwards converted into a secessionist in arms. He never did pipe for "secession," properly so called. His record on this point is ill understood. The writer, as a historical student, has had occasion to examine it very carefully, and he thinks he has discovered in it the clew to one of the most important principles of political science that the late war involved. Mr. Greeley's plan for the withdrawal of the Southern States in peace, was through CONCESSION rather than secession; and the South made the fatal mistake of attempting, by violence, what, in the course of time, it might have accomplished by concession, to a persistent and unanimous demand of a considerable body of a people to withdraw from an existing government, and set up for themselves. The true theory of Republican liberty did, as Mr. Greeley contends, require a yielding to such a demand. Such was the policy of "Concession;" it would not necessarily weaken what might remain of the Union; it would establish no dangerous precedent against the relief of the Federal authority, being simply an affirmation of the right of self-government under the conditions of the Declaration of Independence; and this policy Mr. Greeley defended with ingenuity and with an unimpeachable consistency. But when the South chose the policy of secession rather than that of concession, it was at once seen that this policy involved the fact of the Union existing only at the caprice of any single State—"a mere rope of sand;" that if the doctrine was allowed that any one State might withdraw without the concession or allowance of the others, the Federal authority would be completely at an end, and even what of the North preferred to abide in the Union would establish a precedent against herself of stultification and suicide. The great historical fact is now unquestionable that the chief argument which determined the North for war was that the right of "secession" involved the destructibility, at all times and on all occasions, of even what of the government was left to them at Washington; and the cry "we must have a government" became the popular *decantatum* with which the North went into the war. Now the right of "concession" involved no such consequences, had no such entanglements with a popular clamor; and it was *concession* that Mr.

Greeley plead for—not that the States should say “we *shall* go;” but that the North should say “you go, by our permission, and even with our good will—wayward sisters, depart in peace.”

But this is a curiosity of historical vindication so far removed in time and indeed so little pertinent to the position that we have taken that Mr. Greeley's zeal in the war is not now to be challenged at all in the South, that we cut it short; and finding ourselves on the confines of space allotted to us have only to remind our readers that we shall continue the discussion.

[No. 2.]

MR. GREELEY IN THE WAR.

Having considered Mr. Greeley's position *before* the war, it follows to view him, *flagrante bello*, and then to conclude with what is infinitely most important: his acts and sentiments since the war, and to the present date. We have already prepared the reader to find Mr. Greeley very warm while the war was flagrant: he was always for a vigorous prosecution of the Northern arms; in fact, we believe that he was the author of the phrase in which the Northern aspiration was frequently expressed and became notorious in quotation marks—“a short, sharp and decisive war.” Mr. Greeley, “a man of peace” essentially, yet found it perfectly consistent with this character, when his preference for peace was overruled, to demand that the war should be pressed with vigor so as to make its painful work as short and conclusive as possible. There is no contradiction here between the two advocacies of peace in the first instance, and vigorous war as the alternative.

Mr. Greeley seems to have merely reflected the philosophy of *Polonius* in the play of *Hamlet*—what has generally been taken as a very maxim of polemical counsel:

“Beware
Of entrance to a quarrel, but being in
Bear it, that the opposer may beware of thee.”

And by the way, is there not a striking likeness of character between the “sage of Chappaqua” and this wise old *Polonius*, who, with all that is laughable about him and the simplicity of character that the prince twits, has yet such sage and genial philosophy in his sleeve, and despite all his eccentricities is yet by far the kindest-hearted and the wisest-minded man in the Court of Denmark.

WAR IS CRUELTY.

“War is cruelty,” and although we do not admit the *sequitur* of the sentiment as Sherman once announced it to the Mayor of Atlanta, that “you cannot refine it,” we must confess that it is scarcely more than a question of casuistry what measures of harshness may be admitted into a war, as long as it is shown that such measures plainly conduce to its

rapid termination. And yet it may be claimed especially for Mr. Greeley that though urging a vigorous prosecution of hostilities, he never stained such recommendations with a suggestion of wanton revenge, or of any measure not accounted in the codes of legitimate warfare. He certainly never went as far as Stonewall Jackson, who recommended on our side the *black flag*, and ingeniously defended it as a means of shortening the war. All that can be said against Mr. Greeley is that he was a warm encourager of the war within limits in which we ourselves were thoroughly responsive to him, giving just the same animation to our side of the contest: and this character we have shown to be entirely consistent with the pacific antecedents of the man, his humane disposition, his honor, and what he conceived to be his patriotic duty. Had he been tame or indifferent in the war, he never would have won that respect which it is now remarkable that he has peculiarly in that class of population in the South which represents *par excellence* her "chivalry"—a sentiment that can honor earnestness even in its enemies, and appreciate generosity, even though it be the gift of victors, and there be on it the colors of remembrance of a former bitterness.

MR. GREELEY AND THE NEW YORK TRIBUNE.

Here we must notice especially one grossness in the misrepresentations of Mr. Greeley now current in a hostile or disingenuous press. It is to saddle him with a responsibility for all the sentiments cruel or especially offensive to the South, which appeared in the *New York Tribune* during four years of the war; and that without the least evidence or pretence of evidence of his personal authorship of the obnoxious excerpts. Thus we find going the rounds of a pliable Southern press a paragraph from the *Tribune* of 1861, hoping that the "rebels" might return to devastated homes and read the penalties of their rebellion in the anxious eyes of their wives and the rags of their children!—and this evil aspiration is at once ascribed to Horace Greeley, as if it had assuredly come from his heart and hand. Such accusations are gross with malice or with ignorance. Every editor, whose experience has been beyond the small field and scanty cares of a country newspaper, knows that to a journal like the *New York Tribune* is attached a numerous corps of writers; he must be sensible that Mr. Greeley, with his various employments characteristic of the man, probably never wrote a tithe of its editorial matter; and he must reflect how unfair it is to hold him responsible, in such a situation, for every utterance in which his authorship is not visible or acknowledged. No public man in the country who had ever been an editor, could stand the crucial test of being bound to every sentiment his paper had uttered, and simply because of his editorial tenure. That might make him legally responsible, but surely not morally or popularly responsible for what he himself never wrote or dictated or advised—a matter in which he had neither authorship nor privy. This writer recollects John M. Daniel once writing in the *Richmond Examiner*, with

reference to the mortality of Federal prisoners, that sentimentalism in the extermination of Yankees would be as much out of place as moralizing to interrupt the employment of "*killing chiches!*" Now the undersigned would think it very hard that this odious sentiment should now be nailed at his doors, merely because he was editorially connected with the *Examiner*, and when the fact was that he was neither its author or approver. If there is any class that should do Mr. Greeley justice in separating him from his journal, or at least not confounding him with all the hasty and multitudinous expressions which a metropolitan daily paper must needs pour out from day to day, it is his brother editors who, from professional acquaintance with the subject, best know the injustice of such a strained and confused identification, and who would shrink from its imposition upon themselves. It is of their own interest, and of a just *esprit du corps*, that they should declare for the simple, plain and all-sufficient rule of responsibility: that Mr. Greeley should be identified with his paper only where his authorship was visible, or there were some facts other than his general title of editor to make it the subject of implication.

A QUESTION OF "INTERNAL" EVIDENCE.

And now we go further, and say that the force of implication is decidedly against Mr. Greeley's being the author of any such cruel and savage sentiments as the one cited above for illustration. There is a kind of evidence that is known as "internal" or subjective, which, though it may require some refinement of conception to appreciate, has the quality of being as certain in its conclusions as testimony derived from outward sources or the very hardest facts of the Gradgrind school. Now with such *internal* evidence applied in Mr. Greeley's case, we are morally sure that he could never have been the author of any sentiment of wanton revenge in the war; simply because we well know that there is no bitterness in the composition of the man to originate such sentiments. Not only are they inconsistent with what he is *known* to have written or done in the war, but they are impossible from the very nature of the man. It is one of those gushing natures, easily prompted in any cause that evokes enthusiasm, and yet too simple and direct in its enthusiasm to have mixed with even its wildest flow the debasing tributary of personal passions or the reptile under-current of hate and revenge. If Mr. Greeley is the subject of excitements, they are yet manly excitements; if a fanatic, yet a humane fanatic; if of frothy moods, yet mixed with the "milk of human kindness." With such simplicity of character cruelty is incompatible. A life so busy and earnest does not delay itself with the littleness of personal quarrels, or embarrass itself with any other passions than those which are to contribute to the success of the cause it has appointed for itself. Revenge is but a poor economy of time, even if not condemned in other respects. Men with a real purpose in life cannot afford the aside occupations of personal hatred and controversy.

Doubtless there were those in the ranks of our Northern enemies in

the late war who thought with old murdering Meg Murdockson that "revenge was the sweetest morsel ever cooked in hell." But no such enemy was Horace Greeley, and we may imagine him replying as the sturdy interlocutor of the old hag in Walter Scott's novel does reply: "then let the devil keep it for his own eating, for ——— if I like its sauce." (And if Mr. Greeley did fill up the blank with what Byron, speaking of the national oath, calls "the *honest* English ———," we may believe that it was like "Uncle Toby's" oath, let slip in such a gale and warmth of virtue, that when the accusing angel flew with it to the registry of heaven, the recording angel wrote down the word, then "let fall a tear upon it, and blotted it out forever.")

"QUITS."

It is said that Mr. Greeley abused and caricatured the South in the war. What if he did? Was ever a man so basted and roasted with Southern abuse as he was? and if he is willing to cry "quits," we think he has even the worse of the bargain, and, at any rate, we are not inclined to make any merit of our consent to it.

THE PEACEMAKER AT NIAGARA FALLS.

But there is one fact not yet related by us in Mr. Greeley's war-record, of which Mr. Voorhees and the defamers who follow his lead seem to be strangely forgetful, and which is worth more than all the other speculations we have just reviewed as to the philosopher's real *animus* in the war. It is that he, of all other men in the North, living or dead, made in the progress of hostilities the most earnest and repeated attempts to effect peace, and a peace far more favorable to the South than what she eventually realized. So busy was he with schemes of peace, so eager on every possible occasion when he thought an effort at negotiation might be thrust into the jaws of the war, that he came to be an object of ridicule in this respect. Though he reasonably urged that the shortest road to peace was to be cut out by a vigorous use of the sword, he was constantly imagining that he saw the desired end, and might grasp the apparition of his hopes; he had "peace on the brain;" he was constantly proposing it, hunting it, devising it; and we repeat, it was a peace in which he would notoriously have shown a much greater generosity to the South than that which her persistence in the war eventually lost her.

What has Mr. Voorhees to say to this? Why is he conveniently silent or slighting of Mr. Greeley's noble visit to Canada, to meet on the borders of a foreign country commissioners from the South, to aid them in a mission for peace, to demand for them access to Washington, and to give them his countenance and support, at the risk of all the clamor which the hatred and suspicion of the North could raise. The brave old man then faced all the consequences of an effort made for humanity, and for a peace that would have then secured to the South compensation for her slaves and other measures of generosity, upon which

if we can now look back only in a spirit of useless regret, at least, let it not be one of ungenerous forgetting of the person who was the unbought intermediary and counsel of our unavailing suit. Mr. Greeley in this business left his own for weeks; he travelled to and from Washington; he incurred suspicion and various unpleasantness; he was snubbed by Mr. Lincoln in that famous disrespect of his reply "*to all whom it may concern*;" he was traduced as the confidant and associate of "rebels"; yet he endured all—and for what? Let the gratitude of the South answer, rather than the "restless impertinence" of Mr. Voorhees to make reply in a matter to which he is alien, and to belittle that of which he himself was no giver, and concerning which he has in his own conduct and position no right of criticism.

VOX ET PRÆTEREA NIHIL.

In what corner of the country was Mr. Voorhees hid away and silent, when Mr. Greeley was breasting the storm of popular clamor, and mingling with the roar of Niagara a brave and heroic aspiration, though a drowned one, for the reconciled elements of war? In what napkin was laid away his precious eloquence, when Horace Greeley "in his right hand carried gentle peace to silence envious tongues?" In what has this "Daniel come to judgment" been serviceable to the South, to claim the office and discretion of deciding the claims which other men may make upon her gratitude? What right or propriety in him to speak for the South on a question so delicate and so peculiar to herself? Mr. Voorhees is known in the South chiefly as a man who once made a pleasant speech at the University of Virginia, and has since made other sophomorical and Turvydrop-y speeches, of which the burden is chiefly Turveydrops—"Woman, lovely woman, what a sex you are!"—and such college boy's stock subjects of war as the Spartan mothers dishing their dead sons on shields and the Carthaginian bow-strings *vs.* modern chignons. But even all this feminine and lovely eloquence gives him no title to regulate sentimentalism for the South, and to decide what shall be the measure of her thanks as between the Greeleys who have done her some *real* service, and the Voorheeses who have been barren of everything but words, and these Voorheesy, wheezy, a vapor of volubility and a vanity in the vocative case!

A REMARKABLE LETTER BROUGHT TO LIGHT.

One more evidence of Mr. Greeley's *animus* in the war, and we are willingly done with this part of our subject, to proceed to what is far more vital and interesting. It is an evidence which, though dated after the surrender of Lee, properly belongs to the division of our subject which has undertaken to show Mr. Greeley's feelings *in* the war; since, at the date referred to, so far from having had time to change his feelings, all the passions of the war, were from peculiar causes, instead of declined, at their uppermost. This significant evidence, and which reflects so much light on Mr. Greeley's war record, is a letter copied

below; and of which, before the reader's attention reaches it, we would relate briefly some circumstances. It was written to a private citizen in the South, without a thought of publication, and thus is warranted for its sincerity. It was written when the passions of the war were yet most enraged; when the whole heart of the North was throbbing under the news of Mr. Lincoln's assassination; when the public mind yet burned with a promise of a person not less or other than Andrew Johnson, that "the rebel leaders should be hung as high as Haman;" when all around Mr. Greeley were sounds of rage and revilings, and men spitting in hissings from their lips the curses that writhed upon them. At such a time, and in such surroundings, Mr. Greeley wrote the following letter. It is conveniently brief—and every Greeley paper in the South might put it at the head of its columns:

OFFICE OF THE TRIBUNE,)
NEW YORK, May 16, 1865.)

My Dear Sir—I have yours of the 8th, for which I thank you. I heartily concur with your view of what should be our national policy, and am doing my utmost to have *mercy and magnanimity* its ruling attributes. Only let the late insurgents join with us in saying Slavery is no more, and I think we shall gradually mould the public will to our views. Just now the assassination of President Lincoln has made the North furious; but we shall outgrow that. I shall not hesitate to labor and suffer reproach in the service of *Heaven-blessed* charity and mercy. Yours,

HORACE GREELEY.

In another article we shall show how faithfully Mr. Greeley has fulfilled the pledges of this letter, and how truly he has incurred the "reproach" which he foresaw. But even here, we cannot withhold some words of immediate commentary on it. Heaven's blessing, say we, on the man who thus designated with its blessing the charity he invoked! On reading such a letter, the South may feel its heart turning in its bosom. The man who wrote it has laid all humanity under tribute. The whole American people can never too greatly honor him; there can be no excess, no weariness in the tribute bearers, no possible protest of envy that the pile is too high, or its pretence of lazy unwillingness, because praise has become laborious—and for one simple reason, *viz.*: that in honoring him they are honoring themselves.

[No. 3.]

MR. GREELEY SINCE THE WAR.

Mr. Voorhees thinks Mr. Greeley's bail-bond for Jeff. Davis "a piece of restless impertinence;" again, it was "mock philanthropy;" and then he facetiously remarks that "it is too narrow a plank for any party to stand on." Whereupon, the reporter interpolates, "Laughter and applause from the Republican benches."

The member from Indiana makes a coarse appreciation of this act of Mr. Greeley, as an affair merely of money, in which Mr. Greeley really took no risk, and was superserviceable. He takes no account whatever of the *moral* significance of the act, the generosity which impelled, and

the courage which sustained Mr. Greeley in facing out the clamor of his own party, and incurring a prejudice that has harrassed him to this day, to do an act which "mercy and magnanimity" alone moved him to do, in which at that time he could possibly have discovered no interest of selfishness, but, on the contrary, saw plainly his own condemnation and loss, and the sources of a persecution for years. Base and unjust must be the mind that could omit these noble aspects of the case, and impose upon it a coarse jeer, founded upon a pettifogger's estimate of a great moral stake, in the dollars and cents which were only its counters. According to the pettifogger's estimate, Bassanio's tender of surety to Shylock was a piece of "restless impertinence" for his friend, and a worthless thing not to be accounted in his favor, a "mere matter of form," since he was never enforced to pay it; and according to the same logic, the world has made a very undue fuss about that little affair of Judas' "thirty pieces of silver," which any one of the apostles might have planked down to the greedy Judas, and thus have saved the "restless impertinence" of a very unnecessary sacrifice.

"POETICAL JUSTICE."

The generosity of Mr. Greeley's act and the penalties it nobly incurred have been so abundantly related, of late, that we shall not dwell upon them. We have only to add one suggestion. It is how striking and beautiful is the poetical justice by which there appears now a prospect of a good and noble act, the consequences of which have been to Mr. Greeley for many years only loss and prejudice and reproach, now returning to him as a benefit, the long-delayed, but sure reward of virtue, the "bread cast upon the waters" found again, and its bitterness turned into a savor of sweetness and nourishing. Now, it is the South that must do this justice to Mr. Greeley, this retaliation upon revilers, alike, his and hers. It is she that must complete this apt and admirable picture; and surely she will not neglect an opportunity thus to adorn herself as a Nemesis, and to complete the circle of a situation in which she is to stand as a beautiful and majestic figure of retribution on the one hand, and reward on the other.

A COMPARISON THAT IS ODIOUS.

In his base estimate of Mr. Greeley's surety referred to, Mr. Voorhees degrades it by a comparison with the protection which General Grant gave to the paroles of Gens. Lee and Johnston, so as to save them from arrest. But the two acts are essentially incomparable; and really no ingenuous mind could have attempted a parallel so impossible. Gen. Grant was simply bound to do what he had expressly agreed to do, when he negotiated Lee's and Johnston's surrender. Mr. Greeley had no such obligation upon him to relieve Mr. Davis from prison. Gen. Grant simply did what had been "nominated in the bond" he gave, and which he could not have escaped without manifest disgrace. Mr. Greeley did what he was in nowise constrained to do, what he was under no compul-

sion to do, what he might have avoided, with perfect consistency and safety to his reputation ; in short, he "went out of his way," like the good Samaritan, to do it, and he did it simply and purely *because it was right*. A gentleman who is known to be Mr. Davis' private secretary, and thus intimately conversant with the circumstances of Mr. Greeley's intermediation to relieve him from a nearly fatal imprisonment, relates what influences were used to dissuade Mr. Greeley from his purpose ; while on the other side there was nothing pleading but "heaven blessed charity." He was told that, by signing Mr. Davis' bail-bond, he would lose the election he was then standing for as United States Senator from New York ; he would lose thousands of subscribers to the *Tribune*, and to his books ; he would lose money, place, influence, and even the confidence of the friends who had thus surrounded him to entreat him to a different course. And what was the reply ? "Gentlemen, I know all these things, but what I am to do *is right, and I'll do it!*" Did Mr. Voorhees, from all the fulness of his own rhetorical repertoire, and in all his verbose life, ever produce words so noble as this little string of monosyllables ? Never mind the "curls" and flourishes, did his rhetorical whip ever *crack* like that ?

MR. GREELEY'S ADVOCACY OF AMNESTY.

As a fit and precise counterpart to Mr. Voorhees' coarse and unsentimental estimate of the Davis bail-bond, we find the *New York World*, the mouth-piece of a disreputable Wall street brokerage, declaring that Mr. Greeley's recommendation of amnesty is a very little and unmeaning thing, "the accommodation of a few elderly gentlemen in the South," quite inconsiderable, measured by the magnitude of other public interests. In each instance, the *moral* significance of the act is omitted or disesteemed. No account is made of the merit of Mr. Greeley being the first to speak for universal amnesty, and in sustaining it through an evil report similar to that which dogged his intermediation for Mr. Davis, and aided to aggravate the suspicion of his "tenderness for rebels." And the amnesty he plead for is, at the *World's* suggestion, to be basely interpreted, even by its beneficiaries, as a thing for little thanks, when it is well known that the construction which Mr. Greeley put on this measure was that it meant the entire forgiveness of the South, the pledge, under a seal of public law, that the whole punitive policy of reconstruction, was ended, and a confirmation of the ancient friendship that long ante-dated the war and founded the Union. All the sublime moral significance of the measure, its real import, is set aside by the *World*, to make a degrading arithmetical estimate, logically false throughout, since a *principle*, and not *persons*, is the question.

AN UNDESIGNED TRIBUTE TO MR. GREELEY.

Why is it that the administration party at Washington was only since the Cincinnati nomination worked up to pass an amnesty bill, though a *stinted* one ? Is not, indeed, this measure, considering the time and cir-

circumstances in which it was passed, the most powerful and exceeding tribute that could have been paid to Mr. Greeley, though quite otherwise designed? Is it not the confession that Mr. Greeley was right, and seeing that he has become popular and gathering support, as the advocate of amnesty, the administration party would now cut in and attempt to rob him of his well-earned laurels, and to outbid him on a question which they had formerly, repeatedly, and of their own freest motion, decided to the contrary. But the game was too late—like that of Grant's *now* discountenancing carpet-baggers, since he has seen Greeley's popularity on that side of the question also. We repeat, the amnesty bill, passed when and as it was, will prove merely a contribution to Greeley; and as such we welcome the blundering attempt of the Administration at deception. The people will read it in these plain and unavoidable words: *the tribute which hypocrisy pays to virtue.*

THE CINCINNATI NOMINATION AT WORK.

The effect of the Cincinnati nomination, when first announced at Washington, is a remarkable part of its history. As results, wrung from the existing iniquity at Washington, we had, first, the grudging amnesty; next, Grant's haste to avow, for the future, the discouragement of carpet-baggers; and, as the work of the same drastic dose of Greeley's virtue, the hesitation of the Republican party in Congress on that abomination, the Ku-Klux bill. All these things were the plain results of the alarm which the Greeley nomination had given to the Washington Administration; they were competitions to head off his popularity; and yet we doubt not that they will prove the most direct and effective contributions which have yet been made, to *increase*, rather than to nullify, Mr. Greeley's popularity, and to insure his election.

It is obvious, and the people will plainly judge, that these concessions of the Grant administration have only been affected to meet the demands of popularity in the coming Presidential election; and that, if he should be re-elected, he would be most likely to revenge these concessions by an added and aggravated resumption of despotic rule. It is the usual course of hypocrisy thus to revenge the tribute which it has been compelled to pay to virtue, and when it does throw off the mask and resume its original character, it is notorious that it will be viler and more offensive than ever.

Meanwhile the South welcomes whatever there may be of better fortune to herself in these concessions, no matter what their motive, and as long as they may last; but she is not so dull or ungracious as not to recognize that their true source is in Horace Greeley, and that her rewards of gratitude are to be paid there. If his nomination—the mere influence of his name—has accomplished so much for us, what may we not expect from his election, and the full and honest realization of the virtue of his principles?

THE TRUE ESTIMATE OF MR. GREELEY'S CLAIMS ON THE SOUTH.

But it is not what Mr. Greeley has done in the past, or what the virtue

of his name is now doing: his surety for Mr. Davis; his advocacy of amnesty; his denunciation of carpet-baggers, and his pledge to dismiss them from the South; his well-remembered interposition to save the State of Virginia from Canby's application of the test oath to her Legislature; his interposition, again, to save the same State from the "Underwood Constitution," by prevailing upon the government at Washington to allow a *purging* vote upon it—the issue, indeed, which founded the "Conservative" party in Virginia; his earnest attempts to procure immigration for the South—not even fall these things, though commendable, each, in its own circumstances, which afford the full and just measure of his claims upon the South. They are but the outward and external incidents of the spirit of his pledge of 1865, to make "mercy and magnanimity the ruling attributes" of the government in the South. And it is through the broad invocation of this spirit, rather than through any record of particular acts, ambitious for mere length of numeration, that we would claim for him the gratitude and confidence and rewarding vote of the South. As long as we may be sure that such is the *spirit* of the man, the South may trust him for all details, and that he will deal, as she may justly desire, with all future developments as they arise.

THE VICKSBURG SPEECH.

The spirit that can utter, as Mr. Greeley did, in 1871, at Vicksburg, the "hope that the time might come when the whole American people, North as well as South, might take a pride in the military achievements of Lee and Stonewall Jackson," is safe enough for the South. Nor is it, by any possibility of just construction, offensive to the North; since it simply puts between North and South the ground of a common understanding, and by the possibility of common sources of pride, suggests that most perfect reconciliation, which consults the feelings, as well as serves the interests of each of its parties.

WANTED—AN HONEST GOVERNMENT.

And, though the present writer is treating here specially of the *South's* interest in Mr. Greeley's election, he may yet remark how, in one notable particular, it is coincident with an aspiration, and that a supreme one, of the whole country.

Not only does the South groan from frauds and spoliations, but there is such rottenness wherever the Administration at Washington has a place or an appointment, wherever the black hand of its patronage or the corrupting rod of its power reaches, our public life so reeks everywhere with defilement, that one cry now goes up from the whole country with a supremacy and a pathos never known before. It is the cry for HONESTY. So rare and precious has now become this virtue in our public life, so exceptional, so conspicuous from rarity and so valuable from necessity, that it, alone, should elect Horace Greeley President of

the United States, and weigh down competition, even if all other claims were but as dust in the balance.

"RANK WITH SUSPICION."

It has been well and acutely said that the country wants a President who shall be "above suspicion, yet never beyond investigation." General Grant has confounded these two aspects of the popular vigilance. In immuring himself against *investigation*, he has but opened the door, on the other hand, to a torrent of *suspicion* that has already overwhelmed him. It matters not that he may come scathless from investigating committees of Congress, that he may secure himself technically against convictions, and effect a retreat under the Scotch verdict of "not proven;" the fact remains that he is so rank with suspicion, and his character so rotted away under it, that the honor of the man is gone, and he can no longer be useful in a public station. This is stating the case in the mildest form.

THE HONOR OF GOVERNMENT.

Where we might practice the easy arts of invective or declamation, we prefer a language that may obtain credit by its moderation:—to say simply that the rankness of suspicion is as fatal to General Grant, as President of the United States, as might be the force of conviction, so far as to determine that he can no longer serve the people, because no longer trusted by them. And this moderate and indisputable proposition is alone, sufficient to determine a change of rulers. It is to say that, in the hands of General Grant, the government has become such a subject of suspicion that its whole usefulness is gone, and it is unable to serve the public interests in any respect—even in that apparently most distant from the question of personal character in the President. We are aware that there is a wretched casuistry which would separate the honor of the government from the welfare of the country, and would account the question whether the President be an honest man or not, but a "trim reckoning" of Falstaffian humor, or but a slight concern, personal to himself, and not necessarily involving the public fortunes of his administration. But the two are inseparable; it is a sublime lesson—a grand truth—that the usefulness of a government cannot survive its honor. The latter is not only the ornament of governments, but their indispensable support. We may quote a sentiment from *Junius*, in a letter once addressed to a venal Crown in England, not only for the severity of its truth or the aptness of a parallel, but as containing what is, to our mind, the finest metaphor in the English language:

"The ministry, it seems, are laboring to draw a line of distinction between the honor of the Crown and the rights of the people. This new idea has yet only been started in discourse; for, in effect, both objects have been equally sacrificed. I neither understand the distinction, nor what use the ministry propose to make of it. The king's honor is that of his people. *Their* real honor and real interest are the same. I am not contending for a vain punctilio. A clear, unblemished character comprehends not only the integrity that will not offer, but the spirit that will not submit to an injury; and whether

it belongs to an individual or a community, it is the foundation of peace, of independence, and of safety. Public credit is wealth; public honor is security; *The feather that adorns the royal bird supports his flight.* Strip him of his plumage, and you fix him to the earth."

WHAT KIND OF A PRESIDENT MR. GREELEY WOULD MAKE.

Mr. Greeley, an honest man, in prosaic sooth, "the noblest work of God," is the President to make our government useful at home and respected abroad; to give it a new authority, and a power to effect obedience, without bayonets, in a renewed public confidence; by the same element, to adorn it yet once more in the world's eyes; and, in all, to raise the signal of return to that traditional purity of the Republic of our ancestors, when public office was considered not only a power acquired, but a trust accepted, as sacred in its honor as any that could be contracted between individuals.

THE QUESTION OF THE NEGRO.

But returning to the considerations which peculiarly recommend Mr. Greeley to the support of the South, it is natural that we should examine him with anxiety on the question of the negro—a question which enters so largely and intimately into both the political and social condition of the South.

MR. GREELEY ON NEGRO EQUALITY—"MIXED SCHOOLS," &c.

Here Mr. Greeley has suffered much, as well from hasty conclusions as from obstinate prejudices. As an instance of the persistence and hardihood of misrepresentation in a political campaign, we notice that some so-called Democratic newspapers, not satisfied with hounding Mr. Greeley's record in the war, have even, since the Cincinnati nominations, invented the clamor for a Southern market, that he has come out in favor of "mixed schools" and negro equality in a worse sense than that dogma has yet been imposed upon the South. The misrepresentation is made by a torture of some words recently spoken by him to an assembly of negroes in Poughkeepsie, New York. The words, so far as they are material, are:

"I am not at all sure that the colored race will not, as they now do, as a rule, prefer their own society, and prefer to have churches and seminaries and colleges of their own. Nor am I clear that this would not be a wise choice. So then, I say, with regard to our common schools, where a rural district contains but twenty-five or thirty families, it is simply impossible, where two or three of these are colored, to have separate schools, and in those cases to say that black children shall not go to school with white children is to say they shall not have any school whatever. But in communities such as these, while, if I were a black man, I should not ask separate schools, yet I should still say if the whites chose to have separate schools I should not object to it. I should only ask that the schools for my children should be made as good, as sufficient, as schools provided for other men's children. Then, if the majority chose that the minority should be educated in separate schools, I should say, 'Gentlemen, be it as you please; I have no choice in the matter.'"

Now, every word of this we, as Southerners, not only endorse, but applaud. It suits the Southern position exactly, that "mixed schools"

would be *unwise* in the South, where the negroes are numerous, indeed so numerous as to aspire, as a matter of their own pride and self-assertion, to have schools, churches, &c., of their own, while it may be applicable, as in the case suggested by Mr. Greeley, to communities *in the North*—and it is there precisely that the South would have the application made. We who live in the South know very well that the negroes here do not aspire to such social equality as Senator Sumner and other negrophilists have been insisting upon for them; that, on the contrary, they, as Mr. Greeley opines, “prefer their own society,” and even take a pride in having schools and churches of their own; and that, instead of such “equality” as would intrude them into white company, where they were unwelcome, they are well satisfied with *equivalency*—and “equivalency” they should have, as Mr. Greeley expresses it: “schools,” or any other accommodation “as good, as sufficient” as those provided for the white citizen. It is *equivalency* which the South is willing, in all respects, to concede to the negro, where the mere external or technical “equality” would mean nothing for him but a wanton violation of the feelings of white men, and a mortification and a disadvantage to the negro himself. But when this equivalency of different schools and churches is impracticable, as in the disproportion between whites and blacks in the North, then, insists Mr. Greeley, “to say that black children shall not go to school is to say that they shall not have any school whatever.” And this is precisely our position; equivalency as far as the law can give it, where it is a “wise choice” of the negro to prefer churches, seminaries, and colleges of his own, as a matter altogether of interest, of instinct and of commendable pride—as in the South; and “equality” to the very letter and outward sign and in the teeth of all prejudice, where such accommodation of the negro cannot be, or is not afforded—as in the North. And this disposes of the whole question with a neatness and sufficiency, and such a color of poetic justice in a penalty devised as upon Southern pride, recoiling as upon its authors that there is nothing left to be said—certainly nothing to be complained of by *a Southerner*.

Indeed, so coincident are Mr. Greeley's views of negro equality with what this writer himself has urged from a Southern standpoint, that he may aptly quote here a part of his own recent commentary on Senator Sumner's obnoxious bill, to force the admission of negroes into schools, churches, hotels, theatres and all places where the white man has heretofore chosen to be exclusive:

“Curious and paradoxical as it may at first appear, our opposition to Mr. Sumner's measure is in behalf of the negro—the very party whom it professed to serve. It is no occasion of detriment or of peculiar alarm to the white people of the South; whatever of really worthy social superiority they have, must, essentially, be secure from laws. But for the negro, we protest that for mere paltry gratifications, which he should have sense enough to know never can effect his social equality with the white persons with whom he is brought into a contact purely accidental and temporary, and which never can possibly give him any solid satisfaction since he must always enjoy the short lived entertainment at the penalty of self-respect in intruding where he is not wanted, he

should barter the certain consequences of inflaming against himself prejudices of race, and creating a source of bad blood and of enmity to persecute and destroy him. Mr. Sumner's proposed gifts can be no possible equivalent for consequences so serious. They are unreal—they mean nothing, even for the ambition and vanity of the negro; he has been seduced to take part in a game of faction, in which he can possibly win nothing, and plays his substantial interests against a stake of counterfeits.

"It is true that Mr. Sumner was able to secure for his bill the color of negro petitions; and yet those who know anything of the disposition of the negroes of the South, must be convinced that as a race or people, they were not truly represented in this demand for a strained equality, though many of them might have been over-persuaded or entrapped to serve unconsciously the purposes of a faction. Indeed, the factious character of Mr. Sumner's bill is indicated by the test that no popular movement of the Southern negroes can be found to which it answers; there can be discovered nothing correspondent to it in any condition of the negro mind, any of its known aspirations or excitements. It is a measure originated entirely out of the Senator's own hands, and in which the negroes, as a mass, have shown no sign of interest, and to-day, if rightly examined on the subject, would repudiate and oppose it."

We repeat that the Southern negroes take a natural and commendable pride in having institutions of learning, of worship, and of social exercise of their own. "They prefer their own society," unless where they have been prompted against this natural instinct for purposes of "black-mail," or in schemes of agitation. And in this preference and pride we, with Mr. Greeley, would encourage them; with the distinct reservation that where any substantial rights measurable in law should be denied them through the separation of races, then the separation should be effaced, and give way to the higher demand of equality before the law. Surely the negro can ask no more. And is there a just and conscientious Southerner who would have him to ask less?

THE EASY ART OF MISREPRESENTATION.

There is nothing which gives us more real distress in life, and because we find it at every turn, than the *easy art of misrepresentation*. Every political controversy bristles with this annoyance; and reading, which might otherwise be an instructive employment or an interesting pastime, becomes an insufferable exasperation through what we see in it so constantly of this crime of cowards in the noblest arenas of argument. And then this art of misrepresentation is so easy: its facility offers such temptations to those who are indolent in their modes of thought, or cowardly in those of attack. The most indifferent intellect may do its work. It is only necessary to omit some element in a given case, to conceal some qualifying circumstance, and *presto*, the work is done with due plausibility and effect.*

Thus, we notice that Mr. Voorhees in a recent speech to his Indiana constituency by which he has chosen to supplement his Congressional

*Messrs. Editors of the *Lynchburg Republican*—

When the undersigned wrote of the "easy art of misrepresentation," he then hesitated to distract his argument by a personal allusion, or to burden it with any explanation peculiar to himself. Yet, what he is to say, here and now, may be useful as an additional and striking illustration of how the most innocent may suffer greatly in reputation by the mere omission of his accusers to account or to represent truly a single point of distinction.

In other times, the present writer wrote a good deal to show the utter incompetency

tirade against Mr. Greeley, misrepresents him as the advocate of the extreme abomination of negro equality; and does it just by clouding one little but all important distinction, which we have just reviewed. It is the distinction between *equality* and *equivalency*. Now we repeat substantially that what Mr. Greeley did say in his Poughkeepsie speech, which has been challenged, was that though he hoped for the time when our schools, etc., might be opened with perfect freedom and hospitality to all, yet he was persuaded, and he thought it "wise," that the negroes from their numbers in the South and their disposition in consequence of these very numbers to "prefer their own society," should take their *equality* in the shape of *equivalency*, i. e., in having "as good and sufficient" schools as the whites; while in the North, from their paucity of numbers rendering it impracticable to obtain separate accommodation, the negroes there might have to take their equality as *literal equality* involving the absolute contact and association of whites and blacks!

And to this the South responds, "Amen," "Amen," with the fervor of a camp-meeting.

OPPORTUNITY OF UNION BETWEEN THE NEGROES AND "CONSERVATIVES."

Mr. Greeley has spoken on this subject of "equality" with exceeding wisdom to the negroes, on the one hand, and with signal acceptability to the people of the South on the other; and here, as on other issues, he affords that ground whereon the negroes and the native whites of the South may stand together in supporting him, which we have heretofore remarked as one of the greatest and most peculiar advantages to the South of his personality as a Presidential candidate. That alliance, to

of Jefferson Davis as President of the Southern Confederacy. On this the clamor was raised against him that he had villified the cause and people of the South, and that he could have done so for no other reason than to acquire favor in the North! This censure had a certain plausibility to captivate the foolish and those too indolent to think; it acquired circulation; again and again the writer interposed explanation, but misrepresentations *die hard*, and, to-day he may be to some extent a sufferer from this most absurd accusation. Now, this misrepresentation was done by simply slurring the distinction between *Mr. Davis* and *the cause* represented by the people of the South. Indeed, so far from the writer having villified the South in these respects, his very effort to show that the Confederacy had failed from the incompetency of its rulers, and not from any fault or delinquency of its people, not from failure of their virtue or lack of their exertion, was calculated to defend and vindicate the people of the South, and to save them from a possible, or, indeed, a likely misconception in history. To "show up" Mr. Davis was simply to do *them* historical justice; to show that the "lost cause" had not been lost by any fault or shortcoming of *theirs*. And yet how has this office of the writer, which might have claimed the gratitude of the South, instead of deserving its least word of censure, been misrepresented—and all by abusing or ignoring a distinction that might be put *in nuce*, that is within the periphery of a nutshell.

..... After this slight episode of personal explanation, the undersigned will resume, as occasion may offer, leisure afford, and your courtesy permit, his "Commentaries on the Political Situation," in succeeding numbers of the REPUBLICAN. He never asks favors of his readers. He has but one guide to an audience. It is that the man who is not able to *command attention*, never deserves it.

EDWARD A. POLLARD.

which the name of Horace Greeley is to give possibility at last, and after so many vain attempts to effect it, is the crowning advantage of the support which he claims from the South—a support which the Southern black man and the Southern white man have each, in his own estate and condition, reason to give. To unite them in Mr. Greeley's support would answer a problem of Southern statesmanship, would insure Southern pacification, would date anew Southern prosperity and Southern power, and realize the vision which has too long floated in our dreams and hesitated in our hopes—a New South.

* *

In another article we shall consider Mr. Greeley as occupying the Cincinnati Platform, and the obligations of the Democratic party (not excepting Mr. Daniel W. Voorhees) to support him there.

[No. 4.]

MR. GREELEY ON THE CINCINNATI PLATFORM.

We adhere to the form of personal allusion to Mr. Voorhees, not because he is really personally important, but because in the first instance, we adopted that form as a mere convenience in the order and arrangement of our argument. He has been used simply as the thread to hold together a patched and desultory discourse; and we do not know that he has any such personal distinction as might justly resent the indifferent service we have constrained him to render us.

Shortly after the Cincinnati nomination, Mr. Voorhees telegraphed the following message to his Indiana constituency :

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 4, 1872.

Editor of the Terre Haute Journal :

The Democracy will meet as usual in National Convention, and through its authorized delegates nominate its candidates, and declare its policy. Until then no man has the right to commit the party as to its future action. Its organization and principles should be maintained at all hazards.

D. W. VOORHEES.

Indeed!—And yet the telegraph wires had scarcely carried this message to its destination when Mr. Voorhees did attempt, in an arrogant way, to commit the Democratic party as against Mr. Greeley! What will he say of his own speech delivered among the benches of Congress, to govern political action of a party and the people in a matter, which, whatever else may be its situation, most certainly lies wholly outside of Congress, and that arena of Mr. Voorhees' employment.

Not satisfied with this outrage in Congress, it appears that Mr. Voorhees left his seat and duty there, to post to Terre Haute, and make a second attempt to commit the Democratic party, and especially his own constituency, against Mr. Greeley. This effort is yet the more remarkable of the two.

MR. VOORHEES PUTS HIS FOOT IN IT.

It will sometimes happen that when a speaker disdains to be logical

and pains-taking in his methods of composition, and trusts only to the vigor of his passions to carry him through, he will fall into some very plain contradictions of himself. But we have never known an instance of one being so nicely and effectually ensnared by his inconsistencies as our rhetorical friend from Indiana.

In the beginning of Mr. Voorhees' speech at Terre Haute, following up his ill-timed and ill-mannered Congressional attack on Mr. Greeley, he is quick to complain that Mr. Greeley has not created such a division in the Republican party as to justify the Democratic party in uniting with him! And yet in another and concluding part of his speech, he argues that Mr. Greeley has made so *great* a division in the Republican party that the Democratic party may indulge a fair hope of driving in in a coach-and-six through the breach with a third candidate, and electing such President of the United States! The two positions are in direct antagonism, flatly contradicting each other. It is one of the neatest cases of self-contradiction we have ever known. It is one of those instances of irreconcilable interval between two propositions to which applies the vulgar apothegm of minds muddled and embarrassed to know what to believe: "there is a lie out *somewhere*."

THE SOUTH WANTS A "SURE THING."

Now the very fact, which for argument only we allow Mr. Voorhees, that Mr. Greeley has created such a diversion from the Republican party that the Democrats might have even the slightest possibility of defeating Grant with a third candidate, is to our mind the best argument for making the thing *sure* by the combination of Democrats with Mr. Greeley and his followers. The South, at least, is in no condition to make experiments, and the most forlorn ones at that, if indeed we can consider them as existing at all; she wants a "sure thing," where the question is as of life or death to her—the question whether the despotism that oppresses her shall be disarmed and overthrown, or shall be permitted to grind its heel into her broken heart for four years longer.

HOW THE CINCINNATI NOMINATION WAS CALCULATED.

The Cincinnati Convention was placed in the necessity of obtaining by its candidates the favor of both Republicans and Democrats. In this position which, essentially, was one of ambidexterity, the critical question was, to which side its nomination should more strongly address itself: should it be more directly calculated to please the Democrats or to win votes from the Republican party. On this alternative the Convention wisely decided to cast the balance in favor of effect on Republicans, rather than for conciliation of Democrats; on the calculation that the latter could scarcely help itself, anyhow, from eventually giving in its adhesion to its candidates, as the only hope of defeating Grant. And in this decision it acted wisely and ingeniously. The question thus became to find the man whom the Democratic party might scarcely venture to reject, and who, at the same time, might command the largest possible

following from the Republican party. And this question was eminently answered in Horace Greeley.

Nor is it for the Democratic party—or the Southern portion of it, at least—to complain of the ingenious calculation of this decision; since in the man who can make the largest split in the Republican party, they really have given them their best hope of defeating Grant. The very fact that Mr. Greeley had formerly strong associations with the Republican party, and, that he yet has a continuing influence there, is that which makes him most available now, and, indeed, should be esteemed a fortunate circumstance by all whose real concern is the defeat of Grant. All the pronounced Republicanism and Anti-Democracy which Mr. Voorhees hunts from the past to discredit Mr. Greeley, is really of the very strength of the man to fulfil Democratic expectations *now* in the division of the Republican party and consequent overthrow of the reigning Radicalism at Washington. There has been no more acute and generous sentiment applicable to the present relations of parties than that uttered by Mr. Montgomery Blair, in the character of a Democrat no less in good standing in his party, and certainly much wiser there than Mr. Voorhees. He says: “Since Mr. Greeley has come to rescue the country from the brutal tyranny which so degrades us all, my heart grows warmer to him, and is purged of all resentment for the heavy blows he has struck us in past conflicts, by the reflection that it is only because he has been so stern an opponent of the Democracy through life, that he has it now in his power to save the country.”

THE ORGANIZATION AND PRINCIPLES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY NOT TO BE IMPAIRED.

Mr. Voorhees, in his message quoted above, grandly expounds to the Democratic party:—“Its organization and principles should be maintained at all hazards.” Well, who says to the contrary? The Democratic party, to support Mr. Greeley for President, is not asked to give up any of the opinions which distinguish it as a party, and which may be necessary to “maintain its organization and principles.” *It is a portion of the Republican party that has come to them, not they who have gone to the Republican party.* Or rather, to avoid any invidious comparison, the two, without detriment to the opinions or organizations of either, have come together on certain questions on which they are agreed, and with full liberty to each to act on those in which they are not agreed.

“THE LIVING ISSUES OF OUR TIMES.”

The questions which are to be determined in the impending Presidential contest are no longer questions of technical party politics. They are great questions of constitutional import, and which have a special application to the South, not only in the character of the Democratic party there, but *as the South*. They are—

Whether local self-government shall be restored to the States of the

South, and the rights of all the States shall be secured under a re-affirmed Constitution.

Whether the Federal Government shall be severely limited to the powers which the Constitution gives it.

Whether the policy of "Reconstruction" shall be to extend forgiving and fraternal sentiments to the South, or the challenge of the bayonet.

Whether the whites of the South shall recover their freedom from military despotism on the one hand, and the robbery and oppression of carpet-bag rule on the other.

Whether the negroes and the native whites of the South shall be reconciled by a mutual interest and the inspiration of a common candidate for President, or the war of races be yet further exasperated in the South to conclusions too horrible even for imagination.

Whether there shall be "amnesty" in the unaffected and unequivocal sense of an end of *all* penalties for the past war; and intelligence and character be once more given a voice in the government of the South.

Now on these questions Liberal Republicans and Democrats are well agreed—agreed, on each side, without conceding anything from the separate identity of each as a political party on *other* questions. But those which have been named are the living issues of our times which are to determine the Presidential election, and on which the Democratic party may agree, without detriment to its distinctness of organization or of action in all other respects; why then, thus agreeing, disagree upon men, or allow any other question of men than the *Jeffersonian* formula: "is he true, honest and capable?"

NO OBJECTION TO THE CINCINNATI PLATFORM.

Mr. Greeley, in accepting the nomination of the Cincinnati Convention, ingeniously remarks to them: "Though thousands stand ready to condemn your every act, hardly a syllable of criticism or cavil has been aimed at your *Platform*." This is remarkable. The *Platform* then finds no opponents in the Democratic party. Rather, it should find there its most distinguished and emphatic advocates, since its doctrines, as far as they go, are *par excellence* Democratic. The Baltimore Convention cannot improve for us the Cincinnati platform. It could only give us the same doctrine, though, perhaps, in other words, yet not more emphatic or unequivocal than those which the Cincinnati Convention has already printed. Now let us stick a pin here; for it is the point of the whole argument.

"REM ACU TETIGI."

Now if the Cincinnati Platform or its equivalent is conceded by the Democratic party—and it *must* be conceded—what objection can there be to Mr. Greeley on it? Indeed, his personality in this situation, so far from being objectionable, is an additional recommendation, and for this simple reason: that Mr. Greeley being an honest and faithful man, no matter whatever else he may be, is more certain than any other man

who could be placed upon said Platform to execute its engagements and carry it out in good faith, *as long as he expressly and distinctly promises to do so*. This is touching the gist of the whole question with a sharp point. The Democratic party want a platform of good material, and constructed square against Grant. They have it at Cincinnati. Now they want a Man upon who can be most relied upon when he says: "these are my principles, and I will execute them." And him they may have precisely and excellently in Horace Greeley—a man whose word goes as far as that of any other man in America for good faith. And the only question left after the decision on the Platform is that of good faith: is the Platform conceded, who is the man who will most faithfully carry it out if he engages to do so? And again we answer, Horace Greeley. His engagement is as perfect as words can make it to carry out the Platform; and in the certainty of his engagements, in *meaning what he says*, there is not a man in America who can compete with him.

Thus stands the matter: if the Cincinnati Platform is so good that it cannot be improved upon, if therefore the Democratic party must accept it or its equivalent, then the concern having become only as to the executor of the Platform, the question becomes not what this or that candidate may think of any other subject under the sun, but what he may be relied upon to do, if he accepts that Platform and promises to carry out its doctrine. If the Platform is really desirable, then the most pronounced of Democrats upon it could give us no better assurance than could Mr. Greeley—nay, not an equal assurance to his—that it would be realized or executed. Hence we say that the Platform and Mr. Greeley not only logically go together, but that really the first is improved by the last—the virtue of the doctrine, whatever that may be by the *honesty* of the man who is to execute it.

THE LIMIT OF PERSONALITIES CONCERNING MR. GREELEY.

All other questions of personality here, but the single one of good faith, are essentially excluded; and on that question Mr. Greeley is secure. This properly closes the discussion and determines the controversy. All other personal questions are alien and impertinent; and certainly they ill become that party whose most distinctive and boasted tradition is: "measures, not men." Mr. Greeley's "acceptance" of the Cincinnati Platform properly closes the door to any personal questions which may be raised upon him; and as long as no one ventures to impeach the good faith on which that acceptance has been made and the honesty which will execute its engagements. That point gained, the question of persons is ended; and the Cincinnati Platform is fairly engaged with the existing iniquity at Washington, the one against the other—"measures, not men."

MR. GREELEY, HIMSELF, ON THE QUESTION OF "PRINCIPLES."

One of the best features of Mr. Greeley's letter accepting the Cincinnati nomination is its exclusion of all personal aspects of the controversy

in which the American people have enlisted him. That excellent and independent journal, the *Baltimore Sun*, remarks:—"Indeed, it appears to us that all along there has been entirely too much disposition on the part of a certain portion of the public and the press to exaggerate the importance of the personal characteristics and opinions of Presidential candidates, instead of treating them, according to the old-fashioned American idea, simply as representatives and exponents of opposite principles and systems. That some of our foreign born fellow-citizens should be betrayed into this error by their training under monarchical institutions and the traditions of personal government they have brought with them from the Old World, is not unnatural. That so many Americans, "native and to the manner born," should fall into the same loose way of thinking and speaking, can only be accounted for by the height and excess to which executive power and dictation have been carried within certain periods. It is apparent from Mr. Greeley's letter that he has not forgotten the former maxim of all our old political parties, 'principles before men,' and that he regards the true issues presented for the decision of the American people to be not merely personal ones between General Grant and himself, but the far more important one between the principles of peace, harmony, reconciliation and administrative reform, embodied in the Cincinnati platform, and the policy of force, hate, sectionalism, personal and partisan domination, with which the present ruling spirits have become identified."

What can possibly be the source of personal objections to Mr. Greeley, since he is so fairly and unquestionably identified with the Cincinnati platform, and himself, has so sunk his own personality out of sight, as in a distinct contest of two sets of principles, arrayed against each other! The issue is fairly made and is, alike, unmistakable and unavoidable. The choice is between two policies brought *vis-a-vis*, the one named "Grant" and the other "Greeley." *Nullum est tertium*; and any affectation of such is only a disguise and an indirection of a vote for Grant. "All roads from Greeley lead to Grant."

THE SEAL OF THE SOUTH TO A NEW BOND OF UNION.

Our invocations for a choice as between these two are especially to the South. We want to see her making her choice with all possible unanimity: the closest possible approximation to a unit, both at Baltimore and in the field for Greeley. We want to see her once more in the character of self-assertion, no longer the slighted "poor relations" of a portion of a Northern Democracy, misused for its ambition or interests, but having a will of her own, a great and distinct political element recovered from the past, *a power in the land*. We want to see her using the great opportunity she now has to recover her dignity and power, by acting as a unit and in the character of her own interests. We want to see her governing, as she may, the decision of one of the most important national questions that has arisen since the days of her old political associations. We want to see her thus impressing her resumed character

as "*The South*" upon the politics of the country, and that, not on any instrument of defiance, but in the seals of a new bond of *Union and Peace*.

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